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This paper contributes to the literature comparing the relative performance of ﬁnancial
intermediaries and markets by studying an environment in which a trade-oﬀ between risk
sharing and growth arises endogenously. Financial intermediaries provide insurance to house-
holds against a liquidity shock. Households can also invest directly on a ﬁnancial market, if
they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the
market. Moreover, intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide
more risk-sharing. This creates a trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and growth. We show the
balance of intermediaries and market that maximizes welfare depend on parameter values.
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This paper studies a model in which ﬁnancial intermediaries (which we also call banks) provide
insurance to households against a liquidity shock. The extent to which these intermediaries
are able to provide risk-sharing is constrained by the fact that household can, if they pay a
cost, invest directly in assets on a ﬁnancial market. In equilibrium, the larger the fraction
of household active on the ﬁnancial market, the more investment there is in a productive
technology. This creates an endogenous trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing provided by interme-
diaries and growth. The model allows us to compare economies that are more bank-oriented
(banks hold more assets and provide more risk sharing) with economies that are more market-
oriented (individuals hold more assets and banks provide less risk sharing). As an example
of the former, one can think of Germany while the US is an example of the latter.1
In a static model, growth does not occur and consumers only care about risk sharing.
Hence the trade-oﬀ has no bite and more bank-oriented systems provide higher expected
utility. In a dynamic environment, however, this trade-oﬀ matters. Market-oriented economies
always yield more growth and may yield more expected utility. We study the optimal balance
between intermediaries and markets in steady states and show it depends on parameter values.
The optimal amount of risk sharing provided by intermediaries increases with risk aversion.
For risk aversion parameters suﬃciently low, it is optimal that bank provide no risk-sharing
at all. As risk aversion increases, the optimal amount of risk-sharing increases until banks
are no longer constrained in the risk-sharing they provide. Hence, economies populated by
more risk-averse consumers should be expected to be more bank-oriented and grow slower
than economies populated by less risk-averse consumers. The optimal amount of risk-sharing
also decreases with the fraction of patient consumers.
We build on a model by Fecht (2003) in which banks play two diﬀerent roles: First, as in
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they provide insurance to consumers against preference shocks.
Second, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000 and 2001), they have a better ability to monitor
projects than do unsophisticated depositors and thus intermediate investment for them. We
assume consumers can pay a cost to become sophisticated. Sophisticated consumers have the
same monitoring ability as banks. As shown in Fecht (2003), there arises a trade-oﬀ between
the ability for the bank to provide risk-sharing and the number of sophisticated depositors.
We embed the static model into a dynamic overlapping generations structure, as in Ennis and
1Allen and Gale (1995) provide a comparison of these two types of economies.
1Keister (2003). In this context there is a trade-oﬀ between the amount of risk-sharing provided
by banks and growth. An increase in risk sharing implies less investment in productive assets
and less growth.
There is a large literature concerned with whether a well developed ﬁnancial system can
promote growth, particularly in developing countries. See Levine (1997) for a review. In this
context, ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁnancial markets are typically viewed as complementing
each other rather than as competing. In our paper, in contrast, ﬁnancial intermediaries
increase risk-sharing at the cost of growth. Financial markets, on the other hand, impede the
ability of intermediaries to share risk which leads to higher growth in our model.
Some papers consider speciﬁcally the eﬀects of ﬁnancial intermediaries or ﬁnancial mar-
kets on growth. Levine (1991) argues ﬁnancial markets may promote growth. Jappelli and
Pagano (1994), in contrast, provide evidence that ﬁnancial market imperfections may increase
savings rate and thus growth. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) study a model in which ﬁnancial
intermediaries enhance growth. These papers do not consider the interaction of markets and
intermediaries.
Our paper is related to a literature which compares the performance of market and inter-
mediaries (see, for example, Bhattacharya and Padilla 1996 or Fulghieri and Rovelli 1998).
Maybe closest in spirit to our paper is the work by Allen and Gale (1997). To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the only one that considers the interplay of markets and in-
termediaries. These author consider an environment in which a ﬁnancial intermediary can
provide risk-sharing to overlapping generations of households. However, a ﬁnancial market
constrains the ability of intermediaries to provide this risk sharing. They show a system with
an intermediary and no market can provide a Pareto improvement compared to a system in
which the market is active.
Our model diﬀers from theirs in several respect. For example, we do not consider long-
lived intermediaries. We assume a new generation of banks arises with each new generation
of households. This implies we do not consider inter-generational risk-sharing. In our model
all risk-sharing occurs within each generation. Another diﬀerence is that in their framework
risk arises because of a risky productive technology. Instead, our model considers a liquidity
shock as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Despite these diﬀerences, our results are very close
to theirs, at least in our static environment. In both their and our model a bank-oriented
system is preferred because it allows more risk-sharing. Further, the extend to which banks
can provide risk-sharing is limited by the ﬁnancial market.
2However, dramatically diﬀerent conclusions arise when we account for the trade-oﬀ be-
tween risk-sharing and growth in our dynamic model. Allen and Gale (1997) are unable to
study the impact of risk sharing on growth because their results rely heavily on the fact that
the productive asset is in ﬁxed supply. In contrast, our setup naturally extends to a dynamic
case. Hence, maybe the most important result from our paper is the fact that the implications
for growth play a crucial role in the optimal choice between ﬁnancial intermediaries and a
market.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the static environment.
Section 3 embeds the static model of section 2 in an OLG framework and describes our main
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Static environment
The environment described in this section is very similar to Fecht (2003). The economy takes
place at three dates, t = 0;1;2, and is populated by a mass 1 of households, a large number
of bank which compete for the households’ deposits, and a large number of entrepreneurs.
Households learn at date t = 1 if they are patient (with probability q) or impatient (with
probability 1 ¡ q). In the former case they only derive utility from consumption at date 1,
and in the later case they only derive utility from consumption at date 2. Expected utility
can be written U(c1;c2) = qu(c1)+(1¡q)u(c2). The function u exhibits CRRA: u(c) = c1¡®
1¡®,
with ® > 1. Whether a households is patient or impatient is private information.
There are two production technologies in the economy: A storage technology, which re-
turns 1 unit of good at date t+1 for each unit invested are date t, t = 0;1, and a productive
technology. The productive technology is operated costlessly by entrepreneurs who are not
endowed with any goods. Entrepreneurs decide at date 1 either to “behave”, in which case
the technology has a return of R at date 2 for each unit invested at date 0, or to “shirk”,
in which case the date 2 return is only °R, with R > 1 > °R > 0. Since the focus of
the paper is not on bank runs driven by pessimistic expectations by patient depositors, we
assume the productive technology has negligible scrap value if liquidated at date 1. Under
this assumption runs do not occur.
Competition leads entrepreneurs to promise a repayment of R at date 2 for each unit
invested at date 0. At date 1 a secondary market is open on which claims to the return on
3the productive technology can be exchanged for goods. At date 2, entrepreneurs pay out the
actual return of the project to the holder of the ﬁnancial claim.
Households can either become sophisticated or remain unsophisticated. Sophisticated
households can monitor entrepreneurs perfectly and are able to replace a misbehaving en-
trepreneur without forgoing any of the expected return of the project. Thus, these households
can guarantee themselves a return of R at date 2 if they lend to entrepreneurs. Unsophis-
ticated households are unable to monitor entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs ﬁnanced by such
households will always shirk and their projects will return only °R at date 2. Households
choose whether or not to become sophisticated at date 0. To become sophisticated, a house-
hold must pay a utility cost proportional to its expected utility, (Â¡1)[qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)],
where Â ¸ 1.2
There are several way to think of this cost. It could represent the cost of learning to become
a ﬁnancial analyst or of getting an MBA. Alternatively, it could be the eﬀort spend in order
to monitor entrepreneurs. In either case, the cost could be measured in terms of utility,
resources, or both. The size of Â could be aﬀected by the development ﬁnancial markets, or
the extent to which ﬁnancial instruments are standardized, among other things. In particular,
we assume a benevolent government would be able to aﬀect this cost. For example the cost
could be reduced by subsidizing the schooling necessary to become sophisticated. It could
be increased by imposing restrictions on who is allowed to buy and trade ﬁnancial claims.
Below, we will treat Â as a policy variable and think of a benevolent government that chooses
the cost in order to maximizes households’ welfare.
Instead of investing directly in the market, households can deposit their endowment in
a bank. Banks invest the deposits they have received in storage or in ﬁnancial claims on
the productive technology. They can also trade in the secondary ﬁnancial market at date 1.
Banks can monitor entrepreneurs costlessly and thus guarantee a return of R for the projects
they have invested in. Further, as in Diamond and Rajan (2001), banks can credibly commit
to pay this return to a third party by setting up a deposit contract. Such a contract exposes
banks to runs if they attempt to renegotiate the repayments they have promised depositors.3
In this environment, banks potentially play two diﬀerent roles. On the one hand, they
2Assuming a proportional cost simpliﬁes the analysis when we study a dynamic economy. However, we
expect our results to hold for more general speciﬁcations of the cost. Our results hold also for a proportional
resource cost as we show below.
3See Diamond and Rajan (2000) for a more complete exposition of this argument.
4intermediate investment for unsophisticated households and thus allow them to indirectly
invest in the productive technology, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000 and 2001). On the other
hand, they can provide liquidity insurance to depositors who do not know whether they will
be patient or impatient, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
2.1 Equilibrium allocation
In this section we derive the contract oﬀered by banks. At the beginning of date 0, banks
choose the deposit contract they oﬀer households and households decide whether or not to
become sophisticated simultaneously.4 Let d1 denote the payment banks promise depositors
who withdraw early, and d2 denote the payment banks promise depositors who withdraw late.
If banks provide any insurance against the liquidity shock, then R > d2 ¸ d1 > 1. Fecht (2003)
shows arbitrage pins the price of claims on the productive technology in the secondary market
at 1 and competitive banks will supply the claims demanded by sophisticated depositors.
Consequently, all households strictly prefer to deposit their endowment in a bank as long as
banks provide some liquidity insurance. Indeed, for sophisticated households depositing in the
bank and withdraw at date 1 yields d1 which is greater than the resale value of claims on the
productive technology they could have bought. At date 1, sophisticated households choose
to buy claims on the productive technology in the secondary market. For unsophisticated
households, depositing in a bank is the only way to beneﬁt from the productive technology.
To summarize, at date 1, all impatient households withdraw and consume. Sophisticated
patient households withdraw from the bank and invest on the secondary market since Rd1 ¸
d2, with a strict inequality if banks provide some liquidity insurance. Banks are unable to
prevent sophisticated household from withdrawing their deposits since a household’s type is
private information.
We can now write the problem of a competitive bank. The bank tries to maximize the
utility of its unsophisticated depositors subject to a resource constraint. The bank’s objective
function is
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) (2.1)
4If banks are allowed to move ﬁrst they can oﬀer a contract under which no household has an incentive to
become sophisticated. Our results also hold in this case, as the cost of becoming sophisticated still inﬂuences
the contract oﬀered by banks, but then the secondary market is inactive.
5and the resource constraint is




This constraint says the bank must have enough resources to pay d2 to a fraction 1 ¡ q of
unsophisticated depositors at date 2 and d1 to all sophisticated depositors as well as a fraction
q of unsophisticated depositors at date 1.
Contracts that maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2) are characterized by
d1 =
R















Such a contract will be an equilibrium contract only if it satisﬁes two incentive constraints.
First, it must be the case °Rd1 · d2, otherwise unsophisticated depositors would withdraw
their deposits to buy ﬁnancial claims on the secondary market. This constraint is always
satisﬁed since we assumed 1 > °R. The second constraint, which we refer to as ICS, is
Rd1 ¸ d2. When ICS holds with equality, Θ = R, and sophisticated patient depositors are
indiﬀerent between leaving their deposits in the bank and withdrawing them to invest in the




®¡1 + (1 ¡ q)
¤¡1 : (2.6)
ICS binds whenever i · i. If this happens, the contract is given by equations (2.3) and (2.4)
with Θ = R.
The equilibrium mass of unsophisticated depositors, i, is determined by the condition that
depositors must be indiﬀerent between becoming sophisticated or remaining unsophisticated.
This condition is
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) = Â[qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d1R)]: (2.7)
We can use equations (2.3) and (2.4) to substitute for d1 and d2 in that expression. Then,






(Â ¡ 1): (2.8)
6Using the deﬁnition of Θ, we obtain the following expression for i
i =
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It can easily be seen that an increase in Â, the cost of becoming sophisticated, will lead to
an increase in i, the fraction of unsophisticated depositors. As expected, i = i if there is no
cost of becoming sophisticated, or Â = 1. We can also ﬁnd the cost above which no depositor





(1 ¡ q)R1¡® + q
: (2.10)
If Â ¸ ¯ Â the cost of becoming sophisticated is so high that no depositors chooses to become
sophisticated.
We can derive the amount of investment in the productive technology in this economy,
denoted by K. Part of the investment, (1 ¡ q)i(d2=R), is needed to provide consumption for
unsophisticated patient depositors who withdraw at date 2. The rest, (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ i)d1 is sold
to patient sophisticated depositors on the secondary market. The expression for K is thus
K(i) = 1 ¡
q
1 ¡ (1 ¡ q)i(1 ¡ Θ
R)
: (2.11)
It is decreasing in i. In particular, K(i = i) = 1 ¡ q and
K(i = 1) = 1 ¡
q




The above model gives us a way to think about ﬁnancial systems being more bank-based
or more market-oriented. When the cost of becoming sophisticated is high, there are few
such depositors (i is large) and the secondary market for ﬁnancial claims is not very active.
Banks are able to oﬀer a lot of liquidity insurance but there is relatively little investment in
the productive technology. Conversely, when the cost of becoming sophisticated is low, there
a many such depositors (i is small) and the secondary market is very active. Banks oﬀer little
liquidity insurance, or none at all, but there is more aggregate investment in the productive
technology. Hence, when comparing two economies, A and B, with a diﬀerent fraction fraction
of sophisticated depositors, iA > iB, we say economy A is more bank oriented or, equivalently,
economy B is more market oriented.
72.2 The resource-cost case
The setup is identical except that a young household who decides to become sophisticated at
the beginning of period t will incur a (1 ¡ C) percent consumption loss at the end of period
t or the beginning of period t + 1, for some C · 1.5 In this case, equation (2.7) becomes
qu(d1) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2) = [qu(Cd1) + (1 ¡ q)u(Cd1R)]: (2.13)









1¡® ¡ 1): (2.14)
Using the deﬁnition of Θ, we obtain the following expression for i
i =
(















The rest of the analysis is similar.
2.3 Comparison with a planner’s allocation
It is interesting to compare the equilibrium allocation with the allocation chosen by a planner
endowed with the technologies described above. Since bank runs do not occur in this setting,




qu(c1) + (1 ¡ q)u(c2)
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The planner’s allocation, denoted fc¤
1;c¤
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1 ¡ (1 ¡ R
1¡®
® )(1 ¡ q)
; (2.18)
It is straightforward to see the equilibrium allocation of an economy with i = 1 corresponds
to the planner’s allocation. This occurs if the cost of becoming sophisticated is suﬃciently
5We implicitly assume that, at date 0, when households decide to become sophisticated or not, they are
able to commit to paying the resource cost when they receive d1 from the bank.
8high. In this static model, because capital accumulation does not matter, the expected utility
of households is always decreasing as the cost of becoming sophisticated decreases. Hence,
welfare is higher when banks are able to provide more risk sharing between patient and
impatient depositors and the ﬁnancial market is small. This result is reminiscent of Allen
and Gale (1997). They study an environment in which the market constrains how much risk
sharing ﬁnancial intermediaries can provide. They show, in they model, having intermediaries
and no ﬁnancial markets is preferable to a ﬁnancial market and no intermediaries. As in our
static model, the intuition for their result is that more risk sharing is provided in the former
case than in the latter.
A key feature of the model in Allen and Gale (1997) is that the productive asset is in
ﬁxed supply. Hence it is diﬃcult to extend that environment to include growth. In contrast,
it is straightforward to adapt our setup to a dynamic environment. The next section shows
there is a real trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and growth in a dynamic environment. Hence,
the result that bank-based ﬁnancial systems are always better is overturned in that context.
3 An OLG Environment with Growth
In this section, we embed the static model of the previous section in a two-period OLG
framework along the lines of Ennis and Keister (2003). This allows us to think about how
changes in the number of sophisticated households aﬀect capital accumulation and growth.
As in Ennis and Keister (2003), but in contrast to allen and Gale (1997) or Bhattacharya
and Padilla (1996), we assume a new set of banks arises with each new generation and
banks maximize the expected utility of their unsophisticated depositors. In that sense, banks
are not long-lived institutions in our model. Our result should extend to an environment
with long-lives intermediaries as long as the amount of risk sharing that can be provided by
intermediaries depends on the fraction of sophisticated depositors in the economy.
Each period is divided into two subperiods: in the ﬁrst subperiod (the beginning), pro-
duction occurs, factors get paid, and young households can deposit their wage income in one
of a large number of perfectly competitive banks. Banks purchase existing capital from old
households and decide on new investment and storage. In the second subperiod (the end), de-
positors observe whether they are patient or impatient and they can claim their consumption
goods or shares of capital. The detail are presented below.
9The beginning of period t: At the beginning of period t each old household owns Kt
units of capital and young households are endowed with Lt = 1 units of time. Competitive
entrepreneurs combine the capital and labor to produce a single consumption good Yt using the




µ. The assumption of perfect competition in
the factor markets, and the fact that labor is supplied inelastically, implies the equilibrium real
wage and real capital rental rate in units of the consumption good are given by wt = (1¡µ)Kt
and rt = µ, respectively.
After the production takes place, each old household cashes in [rt + (1 ¡ ±)p
¡
t ]Kt units
of consumption good, consumes them, and exits the economy. Here p
¡
t denotes the price of
capital in units of the consumption good in the beginning-of-period capital market. Note, in
order for old households to be willing to rent their capital to ﬁrms before selling to the banks,
it must be that rt ¸ ±p
¡
t . We show below this condition always holds under our parameter
restrictions.
Each young household has wt units of consumption good in hand and is not sure whether
she will become patient or impatient until the end of the period. These households deposit
all their wage income in a perfectly competitive bank and enter a deposit contract (d1t;d2t).
The bank uses part of the deposits to purchase the existing capital (1¡±)Kt, at the price p
¡
t ,
from old households and divides the rest of the deposits between storage and investment in
new capital. As in the static model, one unit of consumption placed into the storage at the
beginning of period t yields one unit of consumption at the end of the period and one unit
of consumption placed into the investment at the beginning of period t yields R > 1 units
of capital at the beginning of period t + 1. Early liquidation of the investment will result in
inﬁnitesimal return. Note, only banks engage in purchasing existing capital, investing in new
capital, and putting goods in storage at the beginning of the period. We impose parameter
restrictions so the market for existing capital always clears.
As in the static model, young households decide whether or not to become sophisticated
at the same time banks oﬀer the deposit contract (d1t;d2t). A young household who decides
to become sophisticated must exert some eﬀort and incurs a cost of (Â¡1) percent of lifetime
utility, for some Â ¸ 1. We consider the case of a proportional resource cost below.
The end of period t: Each young depositor realizes whether she is patient or impatient.
Impatient depositors only value consumption in this subperiod when they are young while
patient depositors only value consumption in the ﬁrst subperiod of t + 1 when they become
old. The nature of the deposit contract is such that a depositor who claims to be impatient
10gets paid d1t in this subperiod, while a depositor who claims to be patient will get paid d2t in
the ﬁrst subperiod of t + 1. As will be shown, the deposit contract oﬀered by banks induces
sophisticated patient depositors to misrepresent themselves as being impatient. Depositors
can purchase capital from the banks at the price p
+
t . As was the case in the static model,
banks are unable to prevent patient sophisticated depositors from withdrawing because being
sophisticated is private information. Further, competition leads banks to supply the ﬁnancial
claims sophisticated households desire.
The price of existing capital in the ﬁrst subperiod (primary) capital market under which






Our parameter restrictions to be speciﬁed below will ensure that this is the only equilibrium
price for the existing capital in the primary market.
For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
X ´ R[rt + (1 ¡ ±)p
¡
t ] = R[µ + (1 ¡ ±)R
¡1] = Rµ + 1 ¡ ±: (3.2)
In other words, X is the return on long-term investment in the ﬁrst subperiod of each period.
We assume X > 1 and °X < 1. Note, X > 1 implies rt ¸ ±p
¡
t , the condition for old
households to strictly prefer renting their capital to ﬁrms before selling it to banks.
Given the availability of the storage technology, the equilibrium price of capital in the





With this setup the optimal contract is essentially the same as in the previous section with
X replacing R in the expressions below. We have, taking it as given, the following problem
max
d1t;d2t
[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t)]




maxf1;Xgd1t ¸ d2t (ICS)
maxf1;Xgd1t · d2t (ICU)
11The deﬁnitions of Θt and i also are very similar.
Θt ´
·







®¡1 + (1 ¡ q)]
¡1: (3.5)
Solving the maximization problem subject to the (BC) only yields:
d1t =
X(1 ¡ µ)Kt




X ¡ (X ¡ Θt)(1 ¡ q)it
: (3.7)
Taking the deposit contract as given, it is determined by
qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t) = Â[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d1tX)]: (3.8)





(1 ¡ q)R1¡® + q
: (3.9)
We consider Â 2 [1; ¯ Â], which guarantees the endogenously determined it 2 [i;1]. To see this,
substituting (3.6) and (3.7) into (3.8) to obtain
it =
X
(1 ¡ q)X + qA
; (3.10)
where A is given by
A ´
·





For the remainder of the paper we drop the indexes for it and Θt since they are time inde-
pendent.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which each bank holds the same portfolio. The
law of motion for capital is given by










X ¡ (X ¡ Θ)i
X ¡ (X ¡ Θ)(1 ¡ q)i
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt (3.12)
=
Θ ¡ qX + qA
(1 ¡ q)Θ + qA
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt:
It can be veriﬁed that the growth rate of the capital stock, deﬁned by
½ =
Θ ¡ qX + qA
(1 ¡ q)Θ + qA
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ); (3.13)
12is strictly decreasing in Â. Intuitively, a larger cost to becoming sophisticated results in less
sophisticated households participating in the capital market. There is less investment in the
productive technology and thus a smaller growth rate. The growth rate is greater than or
equal to 1¡± (implying that markets for existing capital clear) for all Â 2 [1; ¯ Â] if and only if
R(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)
1 ¡ ±
¸ (1 ¡ q) + qX
®¡1
® : (3.14)
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for actual growth, that is, for the growth rate to be
greater than or equal to 1 (implying net investment is larger than or equal to replacement
capital), for all Â 2 [1; ¯ Â] is that









t[qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t)] (3.16)
plus the utility of the initial old households given by u([µ + R¡1(1 ¡ ±)]K0), which will not








X ¡ (X ¡ Θ)(1 ¡ q)i
: (3.19)
The expression for G is very similar to the expression for d1t, with K0 taking the place of Kt.
Hence, G is related to the amount of investment in the storage technology. The direct eﬀect
of an increase in G is to increase consumption, and thus welfare, but such an increase could
reduce growth and thus, indirectly, welfare. We call G the level eﬀect. Clearly, Θ corresponds
to the risk sharing eﬀect. An increase in the value of Θ means a reduction in risk sharing. The
direct eﬀect of this is to reduce welfare. However, in equilibrium, a reduction in risk sharing
is accompanied by an increase in the number of sophisticated depositors. This, indirectly,
increases growth.
13We are interested in the eﬀect of a change in the cost Â on welfare. It is easy to derive
the following relations:
½
0(Â) < 0; Θ
0(Â) < 0; G
0(Â) > 0; i
0(Â) > 0: (3.20)
While a larger cost to becoming sophisticated tends to reduce both d1t and d2t through slowing
growth, it tends to increase both d1t and d2t through increasing G. There is thus a tradeoﬀ
between the level of consumption households enjoy and the growth rate of the capital stock.
An economy can start with a high level of consumption and grow relatively slowly or, instead,
start at a lower level of consumption and grow faster. A larger cost also leads to more risk
sharing and more liquidity insurance and thus tends to reduce d2t through decreasing Θ. In
this dynamic environment, there is a trade-oﬀ between growth and risk-sharing. Increasing
one must decrease the other.
We think of Â as a policy variable a benevolent government can choose. The eﬀects we
just described imply a change in Â may have conﬂicting eﬀect on social welfare. A given value
for Â results in a given mix of markets and banks and we are interested to know which Â
corresponds to an optimal structure in the sense that the resulting balance between growth
and risk sharing maximizes the social welfare.




G1¡®[q + (1 ¡ q)Θ1¡®]
½®¡1 ¡ ¯
: (3.21)
As expected, welfare increases with G, the level eﬀect, and with ½, the growth eﬀect (recall
® > 1). An increase in Θ, corresponding to a decrease in risk-sharing, aﬀects welfare positively,
which is counterintuitive. Here it is important to remember that G, ½, and Θ are all functions
of deeper parameters which are ultimately aﬀecting welfare. An increase in Θ can be consistent
with an increase in welfare if the deeper parameter responsible for the change in Θ also leads
to, for example, an increase in ½.
We want to ﬁnd the value of Â that maximizes W. Such an optimum exists since W is
continuous on a compact domain of the cost. It is also clear that such an “optimal” cost is
a function of q;X;µ;±;®, and ¯, but is independent of the initial capital K0. An immediate
implication is that a country’s optimal bank-market mix is independent of its initial wealth.
We are unable to obtain analytical results for the value of Â that maximizes this expression.
Instead, we look at some numerical simulations to get an idea of the trade-oﬀs involved.
Parameters for the production function are standard from the macro literature; we choose
14µ = 0:33, ± = 0:1. The model imposes r = µ. We also choose R = 10, so the range of
equilibrium values of i on our graphs below is large. Note, the inequality rR > ± is satisﬁed
as it needs to be. Our baseline for preference parameters is ® = 0:3, q = 0:2, and ¯ = 0:98.
We did extensive robustness checks over the parameter space and ﬁnd that our results are
not sensitive to our choice of parameters.6


























Figure 1. The case with a utility cost
Our ﬁrst numerical exercise concerns the eﬀect of risk sharing on the optimal trade-oﬀ
between ﬁnancial intermediaries and the market. We use the baseline parameters for all
variables except for the coeﬃcient ® which we let vary. In each ﬁgure, we provide two graphs.
The top graph shows the evolution of Θ, G, and ½ for diﬀerent values of i. Here, i is determined
6We use Matlab to compute the analytical solutions to the model. The code is available from the authors
upon request.
15endogenously as Â varies between 1 and ¯ Â.7 The bottom graph shows the evolution of welfare
for diﬀerent values of i.
















































































































































t Â as the value of ® increases. When the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is
low (® = 2), as in Figure 1, welfare is maximized when the cost of becoming sophisticated is
zero and bank oﬀer no risk sharing. For a higher coeﬃcient or risk aversion (® = 3), as in
ﬁgure 2, the optimal cost Â belongs to the interval (1; ¯ Â). It is optimal for banks to oﬀer some
risk sharing, but less than in the static case. Finally, for an even higher coeﬃcient of risk
aversion (® = 5), as in Figure 3, the optimal cost is high enough that no household becomes
7There is a bijective mapping between Â and i.
16sophisticated. In this case banks are not constrained in the amount of risk sharing they can
provide but growth is slow.
The graphs representing Θ, G, and ½ are very similar in each case. As expected, the
growth eﬀect decreases with i as there is less investment in the productive technology. An
increase in i also means a decrease in Θ which corresponds to an increase in risk sharing as
the diﬀerence between d1t and d2t decreases. Finally, an increase in i is accompanied by an
increase in the level eﬀect G.





































































































































































































sponding to small values of Â) is in the risk sharing eﬀect. The increase in the amount of risk
sharing provided by banks, as i increases from low values, is much faster in Figure 1 than in
17Figure 2, and in Figure 2 than in Figure 3. Comparing the same ﬁgures, the main diﬀerences
for large value of i (corresponding to large values of Â) are in the growth and the level eﬀect.
This helps explain the shape of welfare as a function of i. For low values of i, an increase
in the coeﬃcient of risk aversion increases the eﬀect on risk sharing. This means the eﬀect
on welfare from an increase in Â gradually changes from being negative to becoming positive.
The main driving force of the changes for higher values of i are the changes in the growth and
the level eﬀect. These go in opposite direction and it is hard to see from the graphs why the
growth eﬀect becomes relatively less important as the coeﬃcient of risk aversion increases.
Nevertheless, for a high enough value of this coeﬃcient, welfare is maximized if no household
becomes sophisticated.
To summarize the results from our numerical exercises, we can say that if two economies
A and B are populated by households who have coeﬃcients of risk aversion ®A and ®B,
respectively, where ®A > ®B, then households in economy A prefer a more bank oriented
system than households in economy B. As a consequence, economy A will have a lower
level of capital than economy B. When ® is suﬃciently small, the optimal system is such
that banks provide no risk sharing. Intuitively, if consumers are not very risk averse they
do not value risk sharing very much and an increase in risk sharing cannot compensate for
a decrease in the level of consumption that accompanies a reduction of the capital stock.
Conversely, if households are suﬃciently risk averse the optimal system is such that banks
are not constrained in the amount of risk sharing they provide.
In the appendix we report the result of another experiment where we change the value
of q, keeping all other parameters as in our baseline case. In Figures 7, 8, and 9, we see
that if q is suﬃciently small (q = 0:1), welfare is maximized in a bank-only system. As q
increases (q = 0:2), the maximum welfare is reached with a mix of banks and market, where
banks play a smaller and smaller role. Finally, for high values of q (q = 0:3), a market-only
system maximizes welfare. The intuition for this result is straightforward. If the probability
of becoming impatient is small, households put more weight on the consumption they get
when they are sophisticated, which increases when there is less risk sharing.
We also did some experiments changing ¯ while keeping other parameters constant. Per-
haps surprisingly, changes in ¯ have very little eﬀect on the value of Â that maximizes social
welfare. We do not report graphs for this case.
183.2 The resource-cost case
We now consider the case of a resource cost. All relations up to (3.7) hold as before. Taking
the deposit contract as given, the equation for determining it is now given by
qu(d1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(d2t) = qu(Cd1t) + (1 ¡ q)u(Cd1tR): (3.22)














We consider C 2 [C;1], which guarantees the endogenously determined it 2 [i;1]. To see this,
substitute (3.6) and (3.7) into (3.22) to obtain
it =
R
(1 ¡ q)R + qB
; (3.24)
which is constant over time, where
B ´
·





It can then be veriﬁed that as C varies from 1 to C, it varies from i to 1. Note that since
the corresponding Θt > 1 and °R < 1, the solution in (3.6) and (3.7) satisﬁes (ICU). The
solution also satisﬁes (ICS) since R ¸ Θt. Note also that since it · 1, we have Θt ¸ R1=®.
We again drop the indexes for it and Θt since they are time independent.
Since B is increasing in C, i is decreasing in the cost of becoming sophisticated. In words,
the smaller C, the larger the fraction of households who choose to become sophisticated.
The analysis so far is homomorphic to the case with a utility cost, with the underlying
linkage C1¡® = Â. The implication for capital accumulation is, however, slightly diﬀerent
here. We shall again focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which each bank holds the same
portfolio. The law of motion for capital in one region is now given by










CR ¡ (CR ¡ Θ)i
R ¡ (R ¡ Θ)(1 ¡ q)i
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt (3.26)
=
Θ ¡ qCR + qCB
(1 ¡ q)Θ + qB
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ)Kt:
Note, unlike in the case with a utility cost there are here two opposite eﬀects of a resource
cost on the growth rate. The smaller the cost of becoming sophisticated, the more households
19want to become sophisticated. This tends to help investment and growth on the one hand.
On the other hand, as more households become sophisticated, they use resources to pay the
cost. It can be shown the positive eﬀect always dominates the negative eﬀect. In consequence,
the growth rate, deﬁned by
½ =
Θ ¡ qCR + qCB
(1 ¡ q)Θ + qB
X(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ µ); (3.27)
is strictly increasing in C. It is then easy to show the growth rate is greater than or equal to
1 ¡ ± for all C 2 [C;1] if and only if (3.14) holds, and it is greater than or equal to 1 for all
C 2 [C;1] if and only if (3.15) holds.




















































































































































































































0less risk sharing and less liquidity insurance, it promotes more economic growth. What mix
of banks and markets is optimal depends on what mix of growth and risk sharing is optimal
from a welfare point of view. We turn now to examining this issue.
The expression for welfare in this case is similar to the utility-cost case. It is easy to derive
the following relations.
½
0(C) > 0; Θ
0(C) > 0; (G)
0(C) < 0; i
0(C) < 0: (3.28)
We run a similar set of numerical experiments for the resource-cost case as we did for the
utility-cost case. The parameters for our baseline experiments are the same except for ®. We
let ® = 2:85. This value is chosen because, as can be seen on Figure 5, in this case welfare
is the same in an economy where banks provide no risk sharing as it is in an economy where
banks are unconstrained in the amount of risk sharing they provide.



























































1Figures 4, 5, and 6, graph welfare, as well as the three eﬀects that determine it, for diﬀerent
values of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient (in these graphs, ® = 2;2:85; and 4, respectively). The
graphs conﬁrm the general story told in the utility-cost case. When risk aversion increase,
there is a shift from a market-oriented to a bank-oriented system. Interestingly, with a
resource cost we were unable to ﬁnd cases where the optimal cost corresponds to i 2 (i;1).
In words, welfare is maximized either when banks provide no risk-sharing, or when they are
unconstrained in how much risk-sharing they can provide.













































































































































































































































































































































2Figures 10, 11, and 12, in the appendix, show welfare for diﬀerent values of q, the fraction
of impatient depositors in the economy. As was the case for the utility cost, an increase
in q leads to a shift from a market-dominated system to a bank-dominated system in the
resource-cost case. The intuition for this result is the same for both type of costs. Finally, we
considered diﬀerent values of ¯. Again, changes in the value of ¯ have very little impact on
the value of Â that maximizes social welfare. We do not report graphs for this case.
4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature comparing the relative performance of ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries and markets by studying an environment in which a trade-oﬀ between risk sharing
and growth arises endogenously. We consider a model in which ﬁnancial intermediaries pro-
vide insurance to households against a liquidity shock, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Households can also invest directly on a ﬁnancial market, if they pay a cost. In equilibrium,
we show the ability of intermediaries to provide risk-sharing is constrained by the market.
The more households invest directly in the market, the less risk-sharing intermediaries can
provide. Moreover, intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide
more risk sharing. This creates a trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and growth.
We are able to show economies that are more market-oriented always enjoy higher growth,
although not necessarily higher welfare. We are unable to obtain analytical solutions for
welfare so we provide some numerical examples. In particular, we are interested in the optimal
balance between intermediaries and markets (or equivalently between risk-sharing and growth)
in diﬀerent economies. We ﬁnd, everything else being equal, economies in which households
are more risk averse should be more bank-oriented. The intuition is that if households care
less about risk, they value the increase in the growth rate of the economy more than the loss
in risk sharing. These results are robust to changes in the value of the parameters in our
numerical simulations.
It is interesting to contrast our paper with the work by Allen and Gale (1997). These
author study an environment in which a ﬁnancial intermediary provides insurance to house-
holds and show a market constrains the ability of the intermediary to share risk. This result
is very similar to what we obtain in our static model and one conclusion one might draw is
that ﬁnancial intermediaries a preferable to markets because of their ability to provide risk-
23sharing. This result, however, is overturned when we consider a dynamic setting and take
into account the fact that there might be a trade-oﬀ between risk-sharing and growth. This,
we think, is the most interesting ﬁnding of our paper.
245 Appendix

























Figure 7. The case with a utility cost



























Figure 8. The case with a utility cost



























Figure 9. The case with a utility cost



























Figure 10. The case with a resource cost


























Figure 11. The case with a resource cost


























Figure 12. The case with a resource cost
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